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DIVINE IDEALISM AS PHYSICALISM? REFLECTIONS 
ON THE STRUCTURAL DEFINITION OF PHYSICALISM
Jon W. Thompson
Hempel’s Dilemma remains at the center of the problem of defining phys-
icalism. In brief, the dilemma asks whether physicalism should be defined 
by appeal to current or future physics. If defined by current physics, phys-
icalism is almost certainly false. If defined by an ideal future physics, then 
physicalism has little determinable content. Montero and Papineau have 
innovatively suggested that the dilemma may be avoided by defining phys-
icalism structurally. While their definition is one among many definitions, it 
is significant in that—if successful—it would break the impasse for defining 
physicalism. I argue, however, that the structural definition fails because it 
counts metaphysical frameworks (crucially, versions of divine idealism) as 
“physicalist”—an unwelcome result for physicalists. This paper thus furthers 
the debate on the definition of physicalism and sheds light on the relationship 
between physicalism and idealism.
1. Hempel’s Dilemma
Physicalism is often defined as the view that all that exists is what physics 
studies; but many voices have raised concerns over such a definition. In-
deed, the problem of defining physicalism has been with us for some time 
now.1 “Hempel’s Dilemma” puts the problem in exacting focus: when the 
physicalist claims that all that exists is physical, is she claiming that [A] All 
that exists is what is studied by current physics or that [B] All that exists 
is what is studied by some ideal, perhaps future, physics?2 If the physi-
calist intends [A], then physicalism is clearly false. After all, it would be 
difficult to find a physicist with the hubris to claim that her physics is the 
physics, that it will not advance—and likely advance substantially—away 
from positing its current postulates. On the other hand, if the physicalist 
intends [B], then physicalism becomes essentially a vacuous theory. After 
all, it is an open question what kinds of entities an ideal physics would 
disclose—thus the continuous project of physical investigation and dis-
1For a helpful overview of the history of the debate, see Ney, “Defining Physicalism.”
2See Hempel, “Comments on Goodman’s Ways of Worldmaking,” 194–195.
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covery. To claim that physicalism amounts to nothing more than that “all 
that exists is what an ideal physics discloses or describes” seems to give up 
the game. The ideal theory may, after all, allow for the existence of entities 
that are (from the physicalist’s perspective) rather metaphysically suspect 
(such as immaterial souls or ghosts). The physical theory which included 
such entities (and yet provided the best explanation for all the empirical 
data in the ideal theory) would still count as “physicalism” under [B]. But 
surely the physicalist wishes to make a more substantive claim than that.3
2. The Structural Definition of Physicalism
Montero and Papineau are alive to the problem of the definition of physi-
calism, and they have suggested that the dilemma can be answered.4 Their 
proposed method for defining physicalism seems to be to outline the 
structure of the envisioned theory: physicalism’s structure consists in (1) 
the causal completeness of some realm (which they label generically “Q”) 
and (2) the reduction of mental and biological facts to “Q facts.” By out-
lining the structure of physicalism, rather than appealing to either current 
or ideal physical theory, Hempel’s Dilemma can be avoided. It is necessary 
to quote Montero and Papineau at length:
In truth, there are a number of alternative ways of defining “physical,” all 
of which give rise to interesting doctrines arguably worth calling “phys-
icalism.” All that is needed is some way of identifying a category of facts 
(call them “Q”) that satisfies the following requirements: (1) at first sight 
mental, biological, and similar categories do not seem to be Q, but (2) men-
tal, biological, and similar facts nevertheless do have effects among Q facts, 
while at the same time (3) there is good reason to think that Q is “causally 
complete”: that is, that Q-effects always have fully Q-causes. As soon as we 
have a Q-category that satisfies these specifications, we can illuminatingly 
argue as before that mental, biological, and similar categories must after all 
be composed of Q-facts, despite first appearances—for otherwise how could 
they cause their Q-effects, given the completeness thesis that Q-effects al-
ways have fully Q-causes?5
Here, “Q” is a stand-in for physical facts—meaning the content of Q does 
not collapse into current or ideal physics. Very importantly, however, “Q” 
cannot itself be explicitly defined as physical facts—for then we are defining 
physicalism by appeal to the notion of “the physical” or “physical facts,” 
and Hempel’s Dilemma re-emerges. Furthermore, “Q” captures the kind 
of reductionism which the physicalist wishes to advance. Montero and Pa-
3See Melnyk (A Physicalist Manifesto, 12) who adds that if the content of physics is not 
determinable by us now, then physicalism can be neither supported nor undermined by 
empirical investigation. 
4Montero and Papineau, “Naturalism and Physicalism,” 187 ff. For a very different (and 
extended) defence against Hempel’s Dilemma, see Melnyk, A Physicalist Manifesto, 11–14 and 
175–237. Melnyk defends the claim that physicalism can be defined by appeal to current 
physics.
5Montero and Papineau, “Naturalism and Physicalism,” 187.
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pineau admit that this structural approach allows for a range of detailed 
theories to count as physicalism. But, they claim, this is not a problem; 
“physicalism” is a “term of philosophical art that philosophers use in a 
variety of ways.”6 What really matters is that there is causal completeness 
between Q-causes and Q-effects. The centrality of the causal complete-
ness of “Q” is especially clear in light of the so-called “causal argument” 
for physicalism. The argument runs as follows. Substance dualism is 
problematic because it entails that physical causes are not sufficient for 
physical effects. Dualism either entails systematic overdetermination (by 
physical and mental causes at the same time for single effects) or mental 
causation which is unsystematic and inexplicable in relation to what we 
know about the physical sciences. While I will not explore these debates 
in detail here, it is vital to see that (for reasons which will become clear 
below) idealism can preserve the causal completeness of the “Q”-realm 
just as well as traditional physicalism.7
To return to the structural definition, this attempt to avoid Hempel’s Di-
lemma fails—in virtue of the fact that its characterisation of physicalism is 
much too capacious. To see the point, we can plug into the above definition 
another kind of “reductionism”—one totally alien to physicalism—which 
would then become “arguably worth calling ‘physicalism.’” What might 
this be?
3. Jonathan Edwards’s Divine Idealism
Some versions of metaphysical idealism count as physicalism under the 
structural definition.8 I will argue that a particular version of theistic ide-
alism (I will call it simply divine idealism) fits the structural definition 
of physicalism. The conception of divine idealism I have in mind is the 
threefold claim that (1) God exists as an immaterial, infinite, and inde-
pendent mind; (2) all prima facie mind-independent entities—such as oak 
trees, grand pianos, and up-quarks—are actually ideas in God’s mind or 
collections of ideas in God’s mind; and (3) each created mind is actually 
nothing more than a series of ideas created immediately by God. Indeed, 
on this version of divine idealism, bodies and created minds possess no 
existence independent of God’s mind whatsoever. A version of this frame-
work was famously advanced by the early American philosopher and 
theologian Jonathan Edwards. I will briefly lay out Edwards’s arguments 
for these claims—in order to show the texture and coherence of Edwards’s 
metaphysical account.
Edwards claims that bodies (or material objects) are not mind-indepen-
dent or causally efficacious. This is evidenced by the fact that bodies have 
6Montero and Papineau, “Naturalism and Physicalism,” 188.
7For more extensive treatments of the causal argument, see Papineau, “Why Superve-
nience?” and Montero and Papineau, “Naturalism and Physicalism,” 188 ff. 
8Metaphysical idealism has enjoyed a renewal of serious interest of late. See, for example, 
Cowan and Spiegel’s Idealism and Christian Philosophy for several essays on the issue. Of par-
ticular interest for our discussion is Taliaferro, “Idealism and the Mind-Body Problem.” 
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no essential property which is truly independent of mind. As Edwards 
argues:
what idea is that which we call by the name of body? . . . ’Tis nothing but 
color and figure which is the termination of this color, together with some 
powers such as the power of resisting, and motion, etc., that wholly makes 
up what we call body.9
Edwards took Locke to have shown that color is a mind-dependent 
property which emerges from the relation between a body and some 
mind. Furthermore, extension depends either upon color (and is thereby 
mind-dependent) or upon the solidity of a figure: “If color exists not out 
of the mind, then nothing belonging to body exists out of the mind but 
resistance, which is solidity, and the termination of this resistance with its 
relations, which is figure.”10 So solidity or resistance is the best candidate 
for an extra-mental property which captures the essence of bodies. But 
even this does not work. For resistance is either an entity on its own, is 
dependent upon a mind, or is dependent upon color (which is dependent 
upon a mind). But the first option cannot work—because resistance is 
merely a relational property and thus cannot subsist mind-independently 
without color as a subject of inherence. So, resistance (and therefore figure 
or extension) cannot capture the essence of mind-independent bodies. 
And, although resistance and color and extension cannot be conceived on 
their own apart from some other entity, “it is easy to conceive of resistance 
as a mode of an idea.”11 Idealism, then, captures the actual phenomena 
of bodies better than any theory that attributes mind-independence to 
bodies.
Edwards’s idealism is particularly thoroughgoing in that he suggests 
that created spirits or minds—and not just bodies—are ultimately to be 
understood as owing their unity and identity purely to God’s mental 
activity.12 This is because, although we perceive ideas from moment to 
moment, we never perceive a created immaterial substrate or soul which 
supports our individual ideas.13 Edwards writes:
9Edwards, Works of Jonathan Edwards, 6:351.
10Edwards, Works of Jonathan Edwards, 6:351.
11Edwards, Works of Jonathan Edwards, 6:351. 
12Edwards writes that “all creatures and all operations of the universe are only the imme-
diate influence of God” (Works of Jonathan Edwards, 13:326; quoted in Reid, “The Metaphysics 
of Jonathan Edwards and David Hume,” 64). For more detailed discussions of Edwards’s 
view of the metaphysics of mind and personal identity—upon which I am drawing here—
see Reid, “The Metaphysics of Jonathan Edwards and David Hume,” 64  ff. and Wainwright, 
“Jonathan Edwards, God, and ‘Particular Minds.’”
13As Reid points out, Edwards is similar to David Hume in this negative respect—al-
though the former advocates a positive theistic account of personal identity which Hume 
would have rejected. 
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what we call spirit is nothing but a composition and series of perceptions, 
or an universe of coexisting and successive perceptions connected by such 
wonderful methods and laws.14
But what precisely does Edwards mean here? Are there many (human) 
spirits which are somehow responsible for the unity and stability of per-
ceptions or ideas of the external world and of individual minds? Or is 
my spirit or mind somehow responsible for the unity of my own mind 
and the external world? No. The human spirit cannot be responsible 
even for its own unity or identity (much less that of any other spirit or 
of bodies) because of the causal independence of each particular mind’s 
set of perceptions or ideas from one moment to the next. That is, my 
existence at a past moment cannot be the true cause of my existence at 
the present moment because, “no cause can produce effects in a time and 
place in which itself is not. ‘Tis plain, nothing can exert itself, or operate, 
when and where it is not existing.”15 Given that my own past existence or 
mental experience (and even the past existence of other created things) 
cannot possibly be causally sufficient for my existence now, God must be 
the cause of my existence now: “the existence of created substances, in 
each successive moment, must be the effect of the immediate agency, will, 
and power of God.”16 As a result, “what we call spirit is nothing but a 
composition and series of perceptions, or an universe of coexisting and 
successive perceptions connected by wonderful methods and laws.”17 As 
Wainwright states it, Edwards’s view implies that, “a “particular mind” 
is nothing more than a series of “thoughts” (mental phenomenalism) that 
are immediately produced by God.”18 But how does God bring about the 
identity or unity of human minds or spirits? The answer is that personal 
identity is a function of God’s “arbitrary constitution” of things. In short, 
personal identity or unity of the mind (what substance dualists attribute 
to the substancehood of the mind) is in fact a constitution arising immedi-
ately from divine activity. In short, a person’s identity is God sovereignly 
grouping particular perceptions together in a certain kind of way.19 By im-
plication, importantly, any “causal power” we naïvely attribute to created 
14Edwards, Works of Jonathan Edwards, 6:398; quoted in Reid, “The Metaphysics of Jona-
than Edwards and David Hume,” 66. 
15Edwards, Works of Jonathan Edwards, 3:400.
16Edwards, Works of Jonathan Edwards, 3:401.
17Edwards, Works of Jonathan Edwards, Vol. 6, 395; quoted in Wainwright, “Jonathan Ed-
wards, God, and ‘Particular Minds,’” 202.
18Wainwright, “Jonathan Edwards, God, and ‘Particular Minds,” 202.
19Edwards writes that, “created identity or oneness with past existence, in general, 
depends on the sovereign constitution and law of the Supreme Author and Disposer of 
the universe” (Works of Jonathan Edwards, 3:397). Edwards argues for this view in part to 
defend the Christian doctrine of Original Sin: since personal identity is the basis of moral 
responsibility—and God can cause it to be the case that personal identity obtains between 
each human person and Adam—there is no insurmountable objection to the claim that each 
human person can justly be judged for the sin of Adam.
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minds is, properly speaking, to be understood as the causal power of the 
divine Being and His ideas.
4. The Problem: Divine Idealism as Physicalism
Now, I take it that divine idealism, claiming as it does that all things are 
irreducibly mental (albeit mental in a very different way to substance du-
alism), is not the kind of thing physicalists have in mind when they affirm 
the truth of physicalism. Accordingly, any definition of physicalism would 
be flawed which made divine idealism out to be a kind of physicalism. 
However (and here’s the rub), if Montero and Papineau’s attempt to define 
physicalism is correct, then divine idealism turns out to be “worth calling 
‘physicalism.’” For we can think of “God’s thoughts” as the relevant “Q” 
in Papineau and Montero’s formula above, and we can produce a structur-
ally identical reduction in divine idealism. I have laid out below Montero 
and Papineau’s approach to defining physicalism, simply replacing “Q” 
with “God’s thoughts” or “God’s mental life”:
(1) at first sight mental, biological, and similar categories do not seem to 
be [thoughts in God’s mind], but (2) mental, biological, and similar facts 
nevertheless do have effects among facts [about God’s mental life], while 
at the same time (3) there is good reason to think that [God’s mental life] 
is “causally complete”: that is, that the effects [of God’s mental life] always 
have [complete] causes [in God’s mental life]. . . . mental, biological, and sim-
ilar categories must after all be composed of facts [about God’s mental life], 
despite first appearances—for otherwise how could they cause [thoughts 
in God’s mind], given the completeness thesis that [God’s thoughts] always 
have full [causes in God’s own mental life]?
This maps onto Edwards’s divine idealism extremely well. Divine idealism 
then turns out to count as “physicalism” on the structural definition. So, 
the structural definition fails, and we must return to Hempel’s Dilemma.
I can see an initial response to my suggestion, however. Why think that 
there is the relevant causal completeness of divine ideas? Surely the causal 
completeness of physics is its distinctive feature—making it structurally 
distinct from idealism? The first answer from the divine idealist perspec-
tive is that the regularity of cause and effect suggests that God’s ideas 
constitute a causally complete world—in a perfect structural parallel to 
the completeness of physical causes in traditional physicalism. Second, 
Edwards emphasises that the divine ideas are independent of human cog-
nition. Such a claim suggests that my representation or idea of some oak 
tree or grand piano (when I am in the presence of one of them) merely 
participates in the divine idea which pre-exists my entering the room with 
the piano. The beautiful regularity of nature is independent of human cog-
nition, but in no way independent of the divine mental life. Accordingly, 
divine idealism seems to support a surprising version of the “physicalist” 
reduction: because divine ideas are causally complete and responsible for 
all that happens in the world, the human mind does not genuinely con-
tribute causal activity to the world of things as a separate and substantial 
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center of causal agency. And thus the idealist can “reduce” human mental 
life to the mental life of God. Indeed, Edwards seems to make this kind 
of idealist “reduction.” As in physicalism, this version of divine idealism 
turns out to entail that the human mind, if we are to preserve its causal 
capacities, is really something other than what we naïvely thought it was: 
the “effect” of my will to raise my arm is a result of the God’s activity—an 
activity which is characteristically expressed in natural laws. Whereas on 
traditional definitions of physicalism the apparent causal power of the 
human mind is actually constituted by the causal powers of “physical” 
entities, so in idealism the powers of the human mind are in reality to be 
understood in terms of divine activity. The reduction is structurally iden-
tical, so “physicalism”—as structurally defined—picks out both views 
equally. In order to distinguish physicalism from divine idealism, there 
would need to be a working definition of the physical (as opposed to the 
divine ideational). This raises again Hempel’s original dilemma.
5. Consideration of Objections
Objection 1: Divine Idealism Is Unscientific
One possible objection to my argument is that physicalism, unlike ide-
alism, postulates entities which are observable and testable by scientific 
method—such as gravitons, quarks, and magnetic fields. However, it is 
not clear that this is correct. Divine idealism can (and does) comfortably 
postulate such entities too—only not as mind-independent entities. More 
to the point, however, is that Montero and Papineau’s structural definition 
of physicalism is not meant to depend upon the particular postulates of 
current physics at all—precisely because of the inevitable recurrence of 
Hempel’s Dilemma. So little seems to turn on this objection.
Objection 2: Physicalism Is Not Substantially Different From Idealism
Another, stronger objection to my argument is that divine idealism is not 
substantially different from physicalism, since it simply replaces every 
naturally occurring entity with a divine idea. To put the point differently, 
one might worry that divine idealism just amounts to the replacement of 
every naturalistic fact that p with the claim that God has the idea that p.20 
Reductionism can therefore be called “physicalism” or “divine idealism” 
from the perspective of the physicalist; it is merely a linguistic trick to 
suggest, as I have, that divine idealism counts as “physicalism” in a prob-
lematic way. There is no substantive metaphysical difference between the 
two views; accordingly, there is no problem with the structural definition. 
This objection should not placate the physicalist; for divine idealism does 
assert at least four claims which (at least many) physicalists would wish 
to deny.
First, an infinite, immaterial, and eternal mind (that is, God) exists. 
Physicalism, as I understand it, is generally meant to deny just such a 
20Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this objection.
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claim. It may be responded here that there are plenty of physicalists who 
are also theists—so the existence of one immaterial mind need not be a 
shock to the physicalist system. Put another way, “physicalism” could 
be defined locally rather than globally with the structural definition: the 
human mind is reducible to a set of Q facts, although all mentality may not 
be reducible to a set of Q facts. This does not save the structural definition. 
For part of divine idealism is the claim that human mental facts (but not 
divine mental facts) reduce to some other kind of entity. So, this local form 
of the structural definition is still too capacious in that it counts divine 
idealism as physicalism. Importantly, this local version of the structural 
definition counts divine idealism as “physicalism” whether or not facts 
about the human mind are reducible to facts about the brain (or quarks, 
electrons, and the like). Of course, the theist who affirms physicalism may 
choose to define physicalism locally as the claim that “All minds but God 
are ultimately reducible to physical entities.” However, then Hempel’s 
Dilemma simply re-emerges at the local level.
Second, divine idealism should be problematic to the traditional 
physicalist because every putatively “physical” or “material,” mind-in-
dependent object just is in fact a (divine) mental entity. Matter or physical 
stuff is not genuinely fundamental.21 Indeed, stipulated as mind-indepen-
dent entities, matter (or, let’s say, quantum fields or strings) do not exist at 
all. So, the “reduction” which takes place in divine idealism is “upwards” 
reduction, whereas the reduction in physicalism is “downwards” reduc-
tion. If divine idealism is true, we can keep all the entities that physics 
postulates—but only as ineliminably mental entities. That is something I 
think the physicalist will not want to accept. Indeed, this is precisely my 
point in showing the structural symmetry between the physicalist and 
idealist reductions: the physicalist will want to maintain a metaphysical 
difference even though the physics is the same and the “reduction” is structur-
ally the same.
Third, many physicalists want to say that physical entities alone have 
genuine causal efficacy—whereas immaterial substances or human minds 
lack genuine causal efficacy. However, on divine idealism no brains, 
bodies, anvils, or quarks have genuine causal efficacy; nor do finite, imma-
terial minds. Rather, only the one immaterial divine substance has causal 
efficacy. This is problematic because it undermines one of the main argu-
ments for physicalism: the causal argument or argument from the causal 
completeness or closure of the physical. As noted above, the divine ide-
alist can embrace a version of the causal-closure argument by attributing 
all causal efficacy (both human-mental and physical) to the “Q” realm, 
namely, God’s mental life.
21Ney sees this commitment fundamental a-mentality or non-mentality as historically 
central to the development of physicalism: “physicalists preserved the earlier disagreement 
with dualists and idealists who believed in the existence of distinct mental entities not reduc-
ible to physical entities” (“Defining Physicalism,” 1034).
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A fourth and final difference between divine idealism and traditional 
physicalism is that divine idealism bears no relation to materialism and 
physicalism as historically conceived. That is, the physicalist tends to 
view himself as the sophisticated heir to the project of materialism—the 
Hobbesian claim that all phenomena are reducible to the activities of ma-
terial bodies.22 This picture was “bottom-up” and revisionist. However, if 
physicalism is compatible with divine idealism, then it is not the view tra-
ditional materialists intended—namely, that appeal to mentality could be 
fully explained by appeal to fundamental material causes. For the idealist, 
the world is shot through with mentality—though arguably of a quite 
different sort than we initially thought. Given these four significant disso-
nances between traditional physicalism and divine idealism, the objection 
to my argument fails. There are sufficient substantive metaphysical dif-
ferences between divine idealism and traditional physicalism to unnerve 
those who wish to define physicalism structurally.
Objection 3: The Core Program of Physicalism Is Preserved in Divine Idealism
A third objection to my argument is that, as long as the structural defini-
tion of physicalism entails the reduction of facts about prima facie (human) 
mental states to facts about more fundamental physical entities and forces, 
the physicalist can still hold to the “core program” of physicalism.23 My 
response is that nothing about the structural definition guarantees that the 
putatively mental facts are reducible to physical facts—about brains or 
quarks or what have you. Rather, all the structural definition shows is that 
putatively (human) mental facts are reducible to some other kind of facts. 
Nothing about this definition entails that reduction of mind to brain is 
specifically in view. Furthermore, nothing about divine idealism requires 
that there be a reduction from mind to brain before the reduction to divine 
ideas; the divine idealist may claim that human mental states are not re-
ducible to brain states and yet claim mental states are reducible to the “Q” 
category—divine ideas. So, the structural definition of physicalism counts 
divine idealism as “physicalist” without necessarily preserving the “core 
project” of reducing mind to brain (or mind to quarks, electrons, etc.).
Objection 4: The “No Fundamental Mentality” Constraint Can Save the 
Structural Definition
Another important objection is that divine idealism does not constitute a 
real reduction of mental facts to other kinds of facts—but only to divine 
mental facts. It therefore does not really meet the structural definition. Put 
another way, the structural definition of physicalism (in order to avoid a 
22Wilson claims that, “materialism has been rendered a has-been. Its foundationalist spirit 
has survived in physicalism, however, reflecting . . . a move from an a priori to an a posteriori 
characterization of the entities supposed to serve as the ontological basis for all else” (Wilson, 
“On Characterizing the Physical,” 62). For a brief overview of this historical project, see Ney, 
“Defining Physicalism,” 1033 ff.
23Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing out this objection.
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critique like my own) can add the constraint that there is No Fundamental 
Mentality (NFM) in the “Q” facts—the realm to which all human mental 
facts are reducible.24
I will take these versions of the objection in turn. First, as noted above, 
divine idealism is radically revisionist in a way which meets the demands 
of structural physicalism. The substance dualist takes his thoughts to in-
here in a unique, finite substance (as one among many finite substances), 
to have causal powers, and to be uncaused (or at least not immediately 
caused) by physical facts or divine ideas. On each of these points, divine 
idealism concurs with physicalism in claiming non-substantiality, causal 
inadequacy, and “reduction” to another realm—the divine ideational. It 
is unclear why the reduction of human minds to divine ideas does not 
count as the proper kind of “reduction.” Second, if one wishes to add 
to the structural definition of physicalism the constraint that there is no 
fundamental mentality, then we should ask how that stipulation is to be 
understood—a question which raises another dilemma. On the one hand, 
we may understand the stipulation as the claim that whatever the puta-
tively human-mental facts are reducible to, such facts cannot themselves 
be mental in any way. But from the perspective of the divine idealist, 
physical facts may be (indeed are) reducible to divine ideas.25 But I take it 
that the physicalist wants to say that such a further reduction is inadmis-
sible. So, adding such a stipulation (to rule out a view which reduces all 
human minds to “physical entities” and then physical entities to divine 
ideas) makes NFM physicalism look much more like a mere commitment 
than an inductive hypothesis—as it is usually presumed to be by physi-
calists. The physicalist might respond here that physicalism is inductively 
and scientifically motivated, rather than a mere commitment. However, 
structural physicalism cannot rule out the further “reduction” of physical 
states to divine ideas on the basis of scientific investigation alone. The 
NFM constraint therefore is not motivated directly by induction or brain 
science—for the simple reason that the reduction of human mental states 
to physical (or brain) states is compatible with a form of divine idealism 
(under which brain states or physical states are actually ideas in God’s 
mind). On such a version of divine idealism, the reduction of the human 
mind to the brain is accepted without implying NFM. On the other hand, 
one might understand the NFM stipulation as the claim that (being a re-
duction to the a-mental or non-mental) the reduction to “Q” facts must be 
ultimately to physical or material facts; but that of course raises Hempel’s 
Dilemma all over again.
24The No Fundamental Mentality constraint is laid out in Wilson, “On Characterizing the 
Physical,” 69 ff.
25Edwards writes that “the human body and the human brain exist only mentally, in the 
same sense that other things do” (Works of Jonathan Edwards, 6:353).
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Objection 5: The Claim Is Too Modest
A final objection to my argument is that my aim here has been quite 
modest, and this is true. But I would respond in two ways. First, it seems 
to me philosophically significant that physicalism continues to retreat be-
fore attempts to define it. If I am right that the structural definition fails, 
then one avenue of establishing the definition (namely, the structural) 
is unlikely to succeed. Second, it is also highly significant—quite apart 
from the details of Montero and Papineau’s structural definition—that 
some kinds of divine idealism will meet the requirement of the causal 
completeness argument against substance dualism. That is, if we accept 
the causal completeness argument, then traditional physicalism is not the 
only game in town; divine idealism can resolve some of the same issues in 
very different ways.
6. Conclusion
I have by no means attempted to argue here that divine idealism is true. 
However, my argument here does not in any way depend upon the truth 
of divine idealism; rather, I merely wish to point out two significant facts 
about Montero and Papineau’s proposed definition of physicalism. First, 
it has a parallel structure with the historic position of divine idealism in 
the thought of Jonathan Edwards. Second, the structural definition counts 
such divine idealism as physicalism—thus undermining the structural 
approach to defining physicalism. A new dilemma then emerges: either 
physicalism is not well-defined structurally (and we seem to be back to 
Hempel’s Dilemma) or divine idealism is a kind of physicalism. I suspect 
the latter will not be a welcome prospect for the physicalist.
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